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Abstract
We study quality competition in a mixed oligopoly (with applications to health care and
education) where a welfare-maximising public provider competes with two profit-maximising
private providers that differ with respect to the regulatory regime they face, with only one of
the private providers being included in the public funding scheme. We find that changes in
the funding scheme or in the degree of competition have differential effects on quality provision
across the different types of providers and thus generally ambiguous effects on average quality
provision. In terms of social welfare, we find that the two policy instruments in the funding
scheme —price and copayment —are policy complements (substitutes) for suffi ciently low (high)
levels of the copayment rate. We also identify a welfare trade-off between the public funding
scheme’s generosity (price level) and the extent (number of private providers included).
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1 Introduction
There are many services, among them health and education, which are provided by a mix of public
and private providers, but where the relative share of these types of providers varies considerably
across different countries. In such mixed markets, where public and private providers coexist,
competition typically takes place among providers with different objectives and which are subject to
different regulatory schemes. This raises several policy issues. For example, should private providers
be included in public funding schemes? And if so, should such providers be allowed to distribute
profits? In education markets, for example, many countries do not give public funding to for-profit
private schools, while several others, the US included, permit publicly funded charter schools to be
operated by for-profit providers (Boeskens, 2016). Furthermore, in health and education markets
quality is a key concern, and designing policies to ensure a satisfactory provision of quality requires
an understanding of how public and private providers strategically interact, and how they respond
to different funding schemes.
In this paper we analyse the effects of mixed oligopolistic competition on quality provision
in regulated markets where three different types of providers interact: (1) public providers, (2)
publicly funded private providers, and (3) private providers without public funding. Providers of
type 1 and 2 both face a regulated price (paid by the public funder) and a copayment rate (paid
by the providers’consumers), but are assumed to differ in their objectives, with private providers
being more profit-oriented than their public counterparts. On the other hand, providers of type 2
and 3 are similar in terms of objectives, but differ in terms of the regulatory environment in which
they operate. Whereas publicly funded providers receive (part of) their revenues from the public
funder, private providers without public funding must raise all their revenues from the market by
charging a price for their services. Thus, while providers of type 1 and 2 only choose the quality of
the service they provide, type 3 providers choose both quality and price.
Within this framework, we study three different (but related) set of issues. First, we study the
nature of strategic interaction among these three different types of providers and how their quality
provision depends on the characteristics of the funding scheme, which in turn determines the ranking
of equilibrium quality provision across the three types of providers. Second, we analyse the effect
of (intensified) competition on the quality provision of each type of provider and on the average
quality provision in the market. Finally, we include a welfare analysis where we characterise the
normative relationship between the regulated price and the copayment rate as policy instruments,
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and where we also study the optimal degree of public funding coverage in the market.
Although our model is not tailor-made to fit one particular industry, our analysis applies in
particular to regulated markets such as health care and education. In the health care markets
of many European countries, patients can choose between public and private providers within the
national health system, where prices and copayments are regulated, or alternatively choose a private
provider outside the national health system and pay the expenses either out-of-pocket or via private
health insurance.1 A similar mix of provider options is present in education markets, where tuition
fees in publicly funded schools tend to be either absent or regulated, while independent private
schools rely on the fees charged to their students. In such markets, publicly funded private schools
have become a prominent feature across OECD countries (Boeskens, 2016). Average OECD figures
for 2012 show that 14.2% of 15-year-old students attended government-dependent private schools,
81.7% attended public schools, while 4.1% attended independent private schools (OECD, 2013).
Both in health care and education markets, the extent of public funding coverage for private
providers is a contentious issue in many countries. In education markets, for example, proponents
of extending funding to private providers argue that this stimulates inter-school competition and
offers incentives for innovation and quality improvements. On the contrary, opponents argue that
funding private education might lead to public sector resource depletion and ultimately result in a
reduction in educational quality (Boeskens, 2016).
In order to analyse competition among three different types of providers, as explained above, we
use a spatial competition framework with three providers —one of each type —equidistantly located
on a Salop circle. We consider a two-stage game where all three providers choose quality in the first
stage, followed by the price choice of the unregulated private provider in the second stage. Within
this game-theoretic framework we derive three sets of results: two sets of positive results and one
set of normative results. First, regarding the relationship between the characteristics of the funding
scheme and the equilibrium quality provision in the market, we find that a higher regulated price
or a higher copayment rate will reduce the quality provision of the public provider while increasing
the quality provision of at least one of the private providers. The resulting effect on average quality
is generally ambiguous. Furthermore, the highest quality in the market is provided by one of the
publicly funded providers, unless the copayment rate is very high. Second, regarding the effect of
competition on quality provision, we find that stronger competition stimulates the quality provision
1See for example Siciliani et al. (2017) for an overview of the scope for competition between health care providers
in five different European countries
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of the publicly funded private provider but has a generally ambiguous effect on the quality provision
of the other two providers. However, numerical simulations suggest that the relationship between
competition intensity and average quality provision is positive. Finally, regarding the welfare effects
of different funding policies, we find that the regulated price and the copayment rate are policy
complements (substitutes) for suffi ciently low (high) levels of the copayment rate. Furthermore,
when extending the analysis to consider the optimal degree of public funding coverage, we find that
this depends on the level of the regulated price, where welfare is maximised when both, one and no
private providers are funded for low, intermediate and high values, respectively, of the regulated
price. Thus, there exists a welfare trade-off between funding generosity and funding coverage.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we present a relatively brief
summary and discussion of related literature, before presenting the model in detail in Section 3.
The main analysis, both positive and normative, is conducted in Section 4 for a given market
structure in terms of public funding. In Section 5 we extend the analysis to consider the welfare
effects of either removing public funding from the private provider or extending public funding to
both private providers. Some concluding remarks are offered in Section 6.
2 Related literature
Our paper is related to the literature on mixed oligopoly in general and on quality competition
between public and private providers in health care and education markets in particular. In the
theory of mixed oligopolies, a sizeable literature has grown out of the seminal contributions by
De Fraja and Delbono (1989) and Cremer et al. (1989). Later contributions include Cremer et
al. (1991), Matsumura (1998), Bennett and La Manna (2012) and Haraguchi and Matsumura
(2016). A main message from this literature is that the presence of public firms might yield welfare
improving effects in oligopolistic industries, and a key issue has been to determine the optimal
degree of public ownership (e.g., Matsumura, 1998). A common assumption in this literature is
that firms compete either in prices or quantities, and quality is generally not an issue.
There is however a smaller and more specialised literature dealing with quality competition
in mixed oligopolies. Grilo (1994) produced what is probably the earliest contribution in this
literature, studying quality and price competition in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly. A
later contribution building on this work is Lutz and Pezzino (2014), who find that a mixed duopoly
is generally welfare superior to a private duopoly. Laine and Ma (2017) also study quality and price
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competition in a vertically differentiation framework and show the existence of multiple equilibria
that differ with respect to the identity of the high-quality firm (public or private). The latter result
has some parallels to the present paper, where we show that the public provider may or may not
produce the highest quality in the market, depending on the details of the funding scheme. However,
one of several important differences between our paper and all of the above mentioned papers on
quality competition in mixed oligopolies is that the latter papers apply a vertical differentiation
framework, whereas our study is conducted in a setting of horizontal differentiation. Our paper is
therefore more closely related to the type of analysis conducted by Ishibashi and Kaneko (2008),
who study quality and price competition between a welfare-maximising state-owned firm and a
profit-maximising private firm in a Hotelling model. They find that, absent any cost effi ciency
differences, the public firm chooses a lower quality than the private firm in equilibrium, which is
similar to the quality ranking result in our paper for a suffi ciently high regulated price. Furthermore,
they show that social welfare is maximised if the public firm’s objective is a weighted average of
welfare and profits, thus indicating that partial privatisation of the state-owned firm would be
welfare improving.
Common for all the above mentioned papers is that competition takes place in an unregulated
setting, which is another key difference from the present paper, in which two of the three competing
providers face regulated prices. In this respect, our paper is more closely related to papers that
study quality competition in regulated mixed oligopolies, often applied to health care markets.
An early study is Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2002) who analyse quality and price competition
between a public and a private health care provider under different reimbursement rules. Sanjo
(2009) and Herr (2011) also study quality competition between a public and a private health care
provider, but under the assumption that prices for both providers are regulated. These studies
are all conducted within a horizontal differentiation (Hotelling) framework.2 More recent studies
of mixed duopoly quality competition with fixed prices have addressed issues such as soft budgets
(Levaggi and Montefiori, 2013), partial privatization policies (Chang et al., 2018) and location
choices (Hehenkamp and Kaarbøe, 2020). A broader review of the merits of mixed markets in
health care, presented in a unified framework, is given by Levaggi and Levaggi (2020).
A similar type of study, using a Hotelling-type framework, but applied to the education sector,
is Brunello and Rocco (2008), who analyse a mixed duopoly game between a public school choosing
2A similar study using instead a vertical differentiation framework is Stenbacka and Tombak (2018).
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quality (‘educational standard’) and a private school choosing quality and price (tuition fee). As
in the present paper, they find that the public agent can provide either the highest or the lowest
quality in equilibrium. Overall, our paper can be seen as an extension of the above described
literature on quality competition in regulated mixed oligopolies, where we include a richer set of
provider types that differ not only in their objectives but also in terms of regulatory constraints.3
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on the relationship between competition and quality
provision, which has become an increasingly prominent strand of the health economics literature
in particular. The empirical evidence of this relationship in hospital markets with regulated prices
is somewhat mixed, with both positive (e.g., Cooper et al., 2011, Gaynor et al., 2013) and negative
(e.g., Skellern, 2017, Moscelli, et al., forthcoming) effects being reported. This should probably not
come as a surprise, though, given the ambiguous nature of the theoretical predictions (Brekke et
al., 2011).
3 The model
Consider a market for a good (e.g., health care or education) that is supplied by three different
providers that are equidistantly located on a circle with circumference equal to 1. Each of the three
providers is of a different kind. Provider 1 is publicly owned, Provider 2 is a publicly funded private
provider, whereas Provider 3 is a private provider without public funding. The two providers that
are either publicly owned or publicly funded receive a fixed price p1 = p2 = p per unit of the good
supplied. A fraction s of this price is paid by the consumers as copayment, whereas the remaining
share is paid by a public funder. However, these two providers are assumed to differ with respect
to their objectives. We follow the standard assumption in the mixed oligopoly literature that the
public provider maximises social welfare while the private provider is a profit maximiser. The third
provider also maximises profits, but has to raise revenues in the market by charging a price p3 per
unit of the good supplied.
Consumers are uniformly distributed on the same circle. Each consumer demands one unit of
the good from the most preferred provider and the total mass of consumers is normalised to 1. The
utility of a consumer located at x who buys the good from Provider i, located at zi, is given by
3Our paper is more directly an extension of Ghandour (2019) who studies quality competition in a mixed duopoly
where the public provider is subject to price regulation while the private provider is not.
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u(x, zi) = v + βqi − ri − t |x− zi| ; i = 1, 2, 3, (1)
where qi is the quality offered by Provider i and ri is the price paid by Provider i’s consumers. In line
with our previously stated assumptions, r1 = r2 = sp and r3 = p3. The parameters β > 0 and t > 0
measure, respectively, the marginal willingness to pay for quality and the marginal transportation
cost. The latter can be interpreted either as the marginal cost of travelling in geographical space
or the marginal mismatch cost in product space. We also assume that the utility parameter v > 0
is suffi ciently large to ensure full market coverage for all quality and price configurations.
Suppose that every consumer in the market makes a utility-maximising choice of provider. Let
x̂i+1i denote the distance between the location of Provider i and the location of the consumer who is
indifferent between Provider i and the neighbouring Provider i+1. When each consumer maximises
utility, this distance is given by




β (qi − qi+1)− (ri − ri+1)
2t
. (2)
Since each provider has two neighbours, the demand for Provider i is given by
Di (qi, qi−1, qi+1; ri, ri−1, ri+1) = x̂
i+1
i (qi, qi+1; ri, ri+1) + x̂
i−1
i (qi, qi−1; ri, ri−1) . (3)
Substituting from (2), this yields




β (2qi − qi−1 − qi+1)− (2ri − ri−1 − ri+1)
2t
(4)
The Salop model is generally characterised by localised competition, implying that the demand of
each provider only depends on the prices and qualities of that provider and its two neighbours.
However, with only three providers, each provider has all the remaining providers in the market as
neighbours. Thus, all providers compete directly with each other.
We assume that the cost of provision is separable in quantity and quality, with the cost function
of Provider i given by





The profits of Provider i are thus given by




Whereas the private providers (2 and 3) are assumed to maximise profits, the publicly owned
provider is assumed to maximise social welfare, denoted W , which is given by aggregate consumer
utility, denoted U , plus total profits, net of public funding:
W = U +
3∑
i=1










(v + βqi − ri − tx) dx+
∫ x̂i−1i
0
(v + βqi − ri − tx) dx
)
. (8)
Since total demand is fixed, which implies that social welfare does not depend directly on prices
and other monetary transfers, we can more conveniently reformulate the welfare expression as




















i=1 qi (qi − qi+1) +
∑3






is aggregate transportation costs.5 The last two terms in (9) represent the total cost of provision in
the market. It is immediately obvious from (11) that aggregate transportation costs are minimised
(at T = t/12) for a symmetric outcome, where ri = rj and qi = qj , for all i and j, i 6= j.
Our subsequent analysis is based on different versions (or subgames) of the following three-stage
game:
4Notice that, if i = 1, then i− 1 = 3, and if i = 3, then i+ 1 = 1.
5Notice that subscripts i + 1 and i − 1 refer to the two neighours of Provider i located in the clockwise and
anticlockwise direction, respectively. Keep also in mind that r1 = r2 = sp and r3 = p3.
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Stage 1 A welfare-maximising regulator chooses its policy parameter(s), either p (s) or both p
and s.
Stage 2 Each of the three providers chooses its level of quality provision, qi.
Stage 3 The private Provider 3 chooses its price, p3.
The separation of Stage 2 from Stage 3 is motivated by the implicit assumption that the level
of quality provision is more of a long-term decision than the price choice. Furthermore, in versions
of the game where we include Stage 1, we implicitly assume that the regulator is able to precommit
to a particular regulatory policy as a long-term decision. Finally, in order to ensure equilibrium
existence in all versions of the game considered, we assume that the quality cost parameter k is
bounded from below:6




In order to rule out a negative price-cost margin for the publicly funded private provider, we also
assume that p ≥ c.
4 Analysis
In this section we derive and characterise the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. In particular, we
are interested in comparing the equilibrium quality provision across the three different providers,
and how this quality provision depends on the design of the funding scheme and on the degree
of competition in the market. We start out by considering the subgame that starts at Stage 2
of the above described game, which allows us to analyse optimal provider behaviour under an
exogenously given regulatory regime. This is arguably the most realistic scenario, given that prices
and copayment rates might be based on considerations that lie outside the scope of the present
model. However, we will subsequently introduce Stage 1 to the game and analyse the optimal
choice of regulated price for a given copayment rate, before endogenising both policy variables (p
and s) and derive the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the full game.
6See Appendix A for a derivation of the lower bound k.
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4.1 Fixed price and copayment
Suppose that the publicly funded providers face an exogenous price, p, and an exogenously given
copayment rate, s. The game is solved by backwards induction, so we start out by considering the
optimal price chosen by Provider 3.
4.1.1 Optimal private price
At the third stage, the private provider without public funding chooses a price that maximises
the provider’s profits. By maximising π3, as given by (6), with respect to p3, we find that the
profit-maximising price is given by7















We see that the optimal price of the private provider is decreasing in the quality levels of each of
the two rival providers (q1 and q2). A higher quality by a rival provider leads to a drop in demand,
which makes demand more price elastic, all else equal. This reduces in turn the profit-maximising
price. Thus, the price of the private provider is a strategic substitute to the quality of a rival
provider.
On the other hand, the optimal price of the private provider is increasing in the provider’s own
quality (q3). All else equal, a higher quality provision leads to higher demand, which makes demand
less price elastic. Consequently, the profit-maximising price increases. In other words, price and
quality are complementary strategies for the private provider.
Finally, notice that Provider 3’s optimal price is increasing in both the regulated price (p) and
the copayment rate (s). This is due to prices being strategic complements for given quality levels. A
higher p or a higher s implies, all else equal, that the good supplied by either of the publicly funded
providers becomes more expensive for consumers. This leads to higher, and thus less price-elastic,
demand for Provider 3, who optimally responds by increasing the price.
4.1.2 Quality competition
Anticipating the price choice of Provider 3, all providers simultaneously and independently choose
qualities in order to maximise their objective functions. It is instructive to carefully study the
7The second-order condition is trivially satisfied, since ∂2π3/∂p23 = −2/t < 0.
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nature of the strategic interaction between the different providers. Maximising (6)-(7) with respect
to qi, the best response functions are given by8
q1(q2, q3) = β







q3(q1, q2) = β





For each provider, the optimal quality level balances marginal benefits against marginal costs.
Whereas the marginal cost of quality provision is by assumption equal for all providers, and given
by kqi, the marginal benefits are not.
Consider first the two profit-maximising providers. The marginal revenue of quality provision



















The profitability of quality provision depends on the size of the price-cost margin (p − c) and on
the quality responsiveness of demand. All else equal, a higher price-cost margin and/or a more
quality responsive demand will increase the incentives for quality provision. However, notice that
a quality increase by Provider 2 has a direct and an indirect effect on the provider’s demand. The
positive direct effect is counteracted by the fact that a quality increase triggers a price reduction by
the competing private provider (Provider 3) in the subsequent stage. This indirect effect dampens
the incentives for quality provision by Provider 2, all else equal. However, because of the linearity
of the demand function, neither the direct nor the indirect effect of quality on demand depends on
the quality levels chosen by the competing providers. Thus, q2 is strategically independent of the
rivals’qualities.
Consider next the private Provider 3. The marginal revenue of quality for this provider is given
by


























The difference between the two private providers is that Provider 3 chooses its price, p3. The
resulting effect on the incentives for quality provision is captured by the last term in (18). Since
price and quality are complementary strategies for the provider, a higher quality level will have an
additional positive effect on revenues through a higher price. Notice, however, that the magnitude
of this effect depends on Provider 3’s demand (D3), which is decreasing in the quality levels of
the provider’s rivals (q1 and q3). All else equal, a higher quality level by Provider 1 or Provider
2 will reduce the demand of Provider 3, which in turn reduces the latter provider’s revenue gain
of a higher price, with a corresponding reduction in the provider’s incentives for quality provision.
Thus, the quality decision of Provider 3 is a strategic substitute to the qualities chosen by the
provider’s rivals. Notice also that the optimal quality level chosen by Provider 3 is increasing in the
regulated price p. The reason is that a higher regulated price increases the optimal price chosen by
Provider 3 in the last stage of the game, all else equal, which in turn increases the profitability of
quality provision for this provider at the previous stage.
Finally, consider the public provider, which by assumption maximises social welfare. Using (9),






















Once more, the marginal benefit is a sum of direct and indirect effects. Consider first the direct







The first term is unambiguously positive, since a unilateral increase in the quality provision of
the public provider increases average quality in the market. However, the sign of the second term
is a priori indeterminate and depends on relative market shares, which in turn depend on the
distribution of qualities and consumer prices across the three providers. Generally, a higher quality
provision by the public provider increases (reduces) aggregate transportation costs if it leads to a
more (less) asymmetric distribution of market shares.
12











p3 − sp+ β (2q1 − q2 − q3)
2t
≷ 0, (22)
where p3 is given by (13). A higher quality by rival providers (i.e, an increase in q2 or q3) implies
that the public provider has a lower market share, which in turn reduces the effect of q1 on average
quality. On the other hand, a lower market share for the public provider increases the scope for a
negative sign of ∂T/∂q1, which implies that aggregate transportation costs can be reduced by an
increase in q1. A similar ambiguity applies to the regulated price, p. As long as s > 0, a lower price
p increases the market share of the public provider, thus making q1 a more effective instrument
to increase average quality provision. On the other hand, the scope for a detrimental effect of a
quality increase on aggregate transportation costs also increases. Summing these two potentially















We see that the sum of the two effects does not depend on the regulated price, which implies that
the two counteracting effects of a price change exactly cancel each other. On the other hand, the
direct marginal benefit of quality depends negatively on rivals’qualities, implying that the above
described effect related to average quality dominates.
In order to explain how the public provider’s quality provision depends on the regulated price
p, we need to turn to the effects that work through subsequent changes in the private price p3. The

































where p3 is given by (13), and where ∂p3/∂q1 = −β/4. Thus, the public provider’s incentive
for quality provision in order to induce a desired change in p3 depends negatively on sp, and the
intuition for this follows directly from (25).9 A lower value of sp reduces the market share of
Provider 3, which turn increases the scope for a reduction in aggregate transportation costs as a
result of a decrease in p3. And a reduction in p3 can be induced by higher public quality provision.
The above decomposition of direct and indirect effects explains why the public provider’s optimal
choice of quality depends negatively on q2, q3 and sp. A higher quality by any of the rival providers
leads to a reduction in the market share of the public provider, which implies that q1 becomes
a less effective instrument to increase average quality. Consequently, the optimal quality level of
the public provider goes down. A quality reduction by the public provider also results from an
increase in sp, but for a different reason, which is related to the objective of reducing aggregate
transportation costs by inducing a change in the price set by the private Provider 3, as explained
above.






























































In the following, we perform a thorough characterisation of the equilibrium and show how the
equilibrium quality provision depends on the characteristics of the funding scheme and on the
9Although p3 depends positively on sp, it is straightforward to verify, by using (13), that sp−p3 is monotonically
increasing in sp.
14
intensity of competition, as inversely measured by the parameter t.
4.1.3 The relationship between the funding scheme and equilibrium quality provision
In our model, the funding scheme consists of two elements: the regulated price (p) and the copay-
ment rate (s). In the following, we analyse the effects of a change in each of these instruments on
the equilibrium quality provision.
The effects of a change in the regulated price p are given as follows:10
Proposition 1 A higher regulated price p leads to
(i) lower quality for the public provider,
(ii) higher quality for the publicly funded private provider,
(iii) lower (higher) quality for the private provider without public funding if the copayment rate
s is suffi ciently low (high).
The intuition for these results is directly linked to the nature of the strategic interaction in the
quality game. Notice that the two publicly funded providers respond to changes in the regulated
price in a completely opposite fashion, which is caused by the assumed differences in the objective
functions. The profit-maximising provider (Provider 2) responds to a higher price by increasing
quality, because a higher price-cost margin makes it more profitable to attract demand by providing
a higher quality level. For the publicly owned provider, on the other hand, such a concern is
irrelevant because of the assumption that the provider is a welfare maximiser. On the contrary,
a higher regulated price gives this provider an incentive to reduce its quality in order to induce a
price increase by the private Provider 3, with the objective of reducing aggregate transportation
costs through a more equal distribution of market shares.11
Finally, for the private provider without public funding, the effect of a higher regulated price
on quality provision depends crucially on the magnitude of the copayment rate that applies to the
publicly funded providers. If the copayment rate is suffi ciently low (high), the provider will respond
to a higher regulated price by reducing (increasing) quality provision. In order to understand this
result, notice that the mechanisms through which a change in the regulated price affects quality
10The proof of this an all subsequent propositions (apart from those that are trivially proved) are given in Appendix
B.
11More precisely, a higher regulated price will either dampen the public provider’s incentive to reduce aggregate
transportation costs by offering higher quality, or it will reinforce the provider’s incentive to reduce aggregate trans-
portation costs by lowering its quality provision. In either case, a higher regulated price results in lower public quality
provision, all else equal.
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provision are very different for the two private providers. Whereas the regulated price directly
determines the price-cost margin of Provider 2, the effect on Provider 3 goes through demand. If
the copayment rate is suffi ciently low, a higher regulated price will shift demand from Provider 3 to
Provider 2 because of the increase in quality offered by the latter provider.12 This makes Provider
3’s demand more price elastic and the provider will therefore respond by reducing both price and
quality. However, a higher copayment rate will dampen (and might ultimately reverse) the demand
shift from Provider 3 to Provider 2 due to a higher regulated price, because of a larger increase in
the consumer copayment. Thus, if the copayment rate is suffi ciently high, a higher regulated price
will increase the demand of Provider 3 and therefore lead to a higher price and quality offered by
this provider.
In sum, a higher regulated price has a strongly heterogeneous effect on quality provision across
the different providers, with a negative effect for the publicly owned provider, a positive effect for
the publicly funded private provider, and an a priori ambiguous effect for the private provider
without public funding. It might therefore be useful to consider the effect on average quality, q, as
defined by (10). On general form, the effect of a marginal increase in the regulated price on average
















Proposition 2 (i) Suppose that s is suffi ciently close to either zero or one. In this case, ∂q/∂p > 0
for all k > k if (p− c) is suffi ciently high relative to t. (ii) Suppose that k is suffi ciently close to
k. In this case, ∂q/∂p < 0 for all s ∈ [0, 1] if (p− c) is suffi ciently small or if t is suffi ciently high.
Unsurprisingly, given the heterogeneous results presented in Proposition 1, the relationship
between the size of the regulated price and average quality provision is a priori ambiguous. In
Proposition 2 we have identified different parameter sets for which this relationship is either positive
or negative. The characteristics of these parameter sets suggest that the scope for a positive effect
of a price increase on average quality provision is larger if the regulated price is relatively high to
begin with, and if the intensity of competition is also relatively high (i.e, if t is relatively low),
which magnifies the demand responses to changes in prices and qualities. In such a scenario, if
the copayment rate is suffi ciently small, a higher regulated price leads to a higher average quality
because of the quality increase by Provider 2, whereas, if the copayment rate is suffi ciently large,
12A higher price will also reduce the quality provision of Provider 1, but this effect is not large enough to prevent
a demand loss for Provider 3.
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a similar effect is enabled by the quality increase by Provider 3.
The effects of a change in the copayment rate s are summarised below:
Proposition 3 A higher copayment rate s leads to
(i) lower quality for the public provider,
(ii) no change in the quality of the publicly funded private provider,
(iii) higher quality for the private provider without public funding.
A higher copayment rate implies that the good supplied by either of the publicly funded
providers become more expensive for consumers. But this has no effect on the quality offered
by the publicly funded private provider. Notice that Provider 2 maximises profits and a higher co-
payment rate does not influence the profit margin, nor does it influence the demand responsiveness
to quality. In other words, both the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of quality provision for
Provider 2 are unaffected by the copayment rate.
The incentives are different for the welfare-maximising public provider. Since a higher copay-
ment rate reduces the market share of the public provider, this reduces the effect of the public
provider’s quality on average quality (cf. (21)), which all else equal gives Provider 1 an incentive
to reduce its quality provision.
Since a higher s leads to lower quality of the public provider, the private provider without public
funding experiences higher, and thus less price-elastic, demand. This, in turn, gives the private
Provider 3 an incentive to increase the price and therefore also leads to higher quality (because
price and quality are complementary strategies).
Therefore, in our model, each provider responds differently to a higher copayment rate, with a
negative effect for the publicly owned provider, a positive effect for the private provider without
public funding, and no effect for the publicly funded private provider. Thus, it is important to
















Proposition 4 Suppose that the regulated price is not very high nor very low. In this case, there
exists a threshold value ŝ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∂q/∂s < (>)0 if s < (>) ŝ.
Not surprisingly, given the results in Proposition 3, the relationship between the copayment rate
and average quality provision is a priori ambiguous. However, for a large set of parameter values,
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we are able to establish a convex relationship between the copayment rate and average quality,
where a marginal increase in the copayment rate leads to a reduction (increase) in average quality
if the initial level of the copayment rate is suffi ciently low (high). In other words, average quality
is minimised for an intermediate degree of consumer copayment.
This convex relationship has a relatively intuitive explanation. Notice first that a change in
the copayment rate affects average quality directly through an increase (decrease) in the quality of
Provider 1 (Provider 3). In addition, there is an indirect effect through demand reallocation from
Provider 1 to Provider 3. Since a higher copayment rate leads to lower (higher) quality for Provider
1 (Provider 3), this demand reallocation is more likely to contribute to higher average quality the
higher the copayment rate is to begin with.
4.1.4 Equilibrium quality ranking
We proceed to identify the characteristics of the market that can explain the distribution of the
quality provision across the different providers. For this purpose, it is convenient to define three














































Using these definitions, we are able to state the following:13
Proposition 5 (i) Suppose that s < 21c+7t21c+8t , which implies p
∗ < p∗∗ < p∗∗∗. The equilibrium























1 if p > p
∗∗∗.
13The proof of this proposition relies on a straightforward comparison of equilibrium expressions and is therefore
omitted.
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(ii) Suppose that s > 21c+7t21c+8t , which implies p
























1 if p > p
∗.
(iii) If s = 21c+7t21c+8t , which implies p





Although any possible ranking of quality levels across the three providers can arise in equilib-
rium, the above proposition nevertheless reveals some clear patterns, which can be described as
follows:
Corollary 1 (i) If the regulated price p is suffi ciently low (high), the publicly funded private
provider offers the lowest (highest) quality and the publicly owned provider offers the highest (low-
est) quality. (ii) The private provider without public funding offers the highest quality in the market
only if the copayment rate (s) is suffi ciently close to 1.
These patterns are explained by looking at the results derived in Propositions 1 and 3. The
quality of the public provider is decreasing in the regulated price and copayment rate while the
quality of the publicly funded private provider is only increasing in p. This explains why Provider
1 offers higher quality than Provider 2 if the regulated price is suffi ciently low, and vice versa if
the regulated price is suffi ciently high.
For the private provider without public funding, we have seen from Proposition 1 that the
relationship between the regulated price and equilibrium quality provision for this provider depends
crucially on the size of the copayment rate s. The quality provision of Provider 3 is increasing in p
only if s is suffi ciently high, which explains why the private provider without public funding might
offer the highest quality in the market only if both p and s are suffi ciently high.
4.1.5 Competition intensity and quality provision
In spatial competition models, a standard competition measure is the (inverse of) transportation
costs. Lower transportation costs increase the degree of substitutability between the goods offered
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by different providers, which intensifies competition. In our model, the publicly funded providers
only choose their qualities for a given regulated price. On the contrary, the private provider
without public funding chooses both quality and price. Hence, more competition makes demand
more responsive to changes in qualities and prices.
Generally, more competition has two countering effects on quality. The direct effect is that
increased competition makes demand more responsive to a marginal increase in quality for given
prices. However, if prices are endogenous there is also an indirect effect due to the fact that increased
competition makes consumers more responsive to price changes, which all else equal leads to lower
prices and thus reduces providers’marginal return to quality investments. This indirect effect
counteracts the aforementioned direct effect and makes the relationship between competition and
quality provision a priori ambiguous for the private provider without public funding.
Proposition 6 More competition (lower t) has the following effects on the quality provision of
each provider:
(i) The public provider increases (decreases) quality if p is suffi ciently low (high).
(ii) The publicly funded private provider increases quality.
(iii) If the regulated price is not very high nor very low, there exists a threshold value s̃ ∈ (0, 1)
such that the private provider without public funding reduces (increases) quality if s < (>) s̃.
For the private provider with public funding, the effect of more competition is unambiguous
and standard. Lower transportation costs make the provider’s demand more responsive to quality
changes and, given a positive price-cost margin, the provider increases its quality provision in order
to attract more demand.
For the two other providers, though, increased competition has an ambiguous effect on the
incentives for quality provision. We find that the public provider has an incentive to increase
(decrease) its quality provision in response to more competition if the regulated price is suffi ciently
low (high). In order to explain the intuition behind this result, we focus on the public provider’s
incentive to use its quality provision as an instrument to increase average quality in the market. The
effectiveness of this instrument depends on relative market shares. More specifically, the larger the
market share of the public provider, the larger is the effect of an increase in the provider’s quality
on average quality in the market. More competition (lower t) makes demand more quality and
price elastic. In an asymmetric equilibrium (with quality and price differences), more competition
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therefore leads to a reallocation of demand towards providers with higher quality and/or lower
price. If p is suffi ciently low (high), the public provider is the high (low) quality provider in the
market (cf. Proposition 5). Therefore, for a suffi ciently low p, increased competition leads to an
inflow of consumers towards the public provider, which, in turn, expands its market share (higher
D1). This makes q1 a more effective instrument to increase average quality, resulting in stronger
incentives for quality provision by the public provider. The reverse result (i.e., ∂q1/∂t > 0) requires
that p is suffi ciently high.
For the private provider without public funding, there are two main channels through which
more competition affects the provider’s incentives for quality investments. The first channel is a
strategic response to the other private provider. A reduction in t triggers a quality increase by
Provider 2, which in turn leads to lower, and thus more price-elastic, demand for Provider 3, who
optimally responds by decreasing the price. This reduces the profitability of quality provision for
Provider 3 and leads to lower quality (because p3 and q3 are complementary strategies). On the
other hand, competition leads to a demand reallocation, which depends on relative quality levels,
as previously explained. The higher s is, the higher is the equilibrium quality provision of Provider
3 relative to the other providers (cf. Proposition 3). Thus, for a suffi ciently high s, increased
competition leads to a demand reallocation towards Provider 3, who experiences higher, and thus
less price-elastic, demand. This gives Provider 3 an incentive to increase the price and in turn
quality, thus counteracting the effect of the aforementioned strategic response to the other private
provider. If s is suffi ciently high, the effect working through demand reallocation is the dominating
effect, leading to an overall increase in quality provision by Provider 3. On the other hand, if s is
suffi ciently low, the effect of demand reallocation reinforces the strategic response effect, leading to
a reduction in q3.
In sum, the relationship between competition and quality provision for Provider 2 is positive,
while it has an indeterminate sign for the two other providers. Therefore, it is a priori not clear
whether the effect of more competition on average quality, q, is positive or negative. While it is
not possible to determine the sign of this effect analytically, numerical simulations suggest that
the effect of more competition (a reduction in t) on average quality provision is unambiguously
positive, implying that the increase in quality provision by the publicly funded private provider is
always suffi cient to outweigh any quality reduction by the other providers.
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4.2 Optimal price for a given copayment rate
We now turn to the normative part of our analysis. Suppose that the copayment rate is exogenously
given, but that the public payer, at an initial stage of the game, chooses a welfare-maximising price
for the two publicly funded providers.14 Given the equilibrium outcomes in (27)-(30), we maximise




























































The relationship between the copayment rate and the welfare-maximising price can be described
as follows:
Proposition 7 A marginal increase in the copayment rate, s, leads to an increase (decrease) in
the optimal price, p (s), if the copayment rate is initially suffi ciently low (high).
In other words, there is a positive relationship between the price and the copayment rate if the
copayment rate is suffi ciently low, while this relationship is negative for suffi ciently high values of
the copayment rate. In order to trace the intuition behind this result, notice that social welfare
is maximised at a price which balances marginal social (net) benefit of improved quality against
marginal costs, which implies that quality can be either underprovided or overprovided from a social
14We can think of this scenario as the level of the copayment rate being set to satisfy considerations that are
not explicitly modelled in our framework. For example, the copayment rate might be set at a relatively low level to
ensure broad access to the good offered by the two publicly funded providers.
15The assumption in (12) ensures that the second-order condition of the welfare-maximising problem is satisfied
(see Appendix A for details).
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welfare perspective. Whereas the marginal cost of quality is by assumption equal for all providers,
the marginal benefits are not. On the one hand, if s is relatively low to begin with, we know that
average quality decreases in response to a higher copayment rate due to the convex relationship
established by Proposition 4. Thus, if s increases from a suffi ciently low initial value, the regulator
would like to stimulate quality provision, and this can be done by increasing the price, as indicated
by the first part of Proposition 2. On the other hand, for a suffi ciently high initial value of s, the
effect of a further increase in the copayment rate on average quality is positive (cf. Proposition
4). In this case, the regulator would like to dampen incentives for quality provision, which can be
achieved by lowering the price (once more, given the result in the first part of Proposition 2).
As in the previous section, we proceed by ranking the equilibrium quality levels across the three
providers, but now setting the regulated price at the welfare-maximising level. In other words, we
compare the equilibrium quality across providers given the welfare-maximising price level, p (s),
which produces the following ranking:16
Proposition 8 Suppose that the regulated price is set at the welfare-maximising level, given by
(36). In this case,
(i) if s < 21c+7t21c+8t , the equilibrium quality ranking is given by
q∗2 (s) > q
∗
1 (s) > q
∗
3 (s) ;
(ii) if s > 21c+7t21c+8t , the equilibrium quality ranking is given by
q∗3 (s) > q
∗
1 (s) > q
∗
2 (s) .
For any given copayment rate, the quality offered by the public provider always lies between
the qualities offered by the high-quality and low-quality providers, respectively. The highest and
lowest quality in the market is always offered by a private provider. Unless the copayment rate is
very close to one, the publicly funded private provider has the highest quality, whereas the private
provider without public funding has the lowest quality in the market, but these roles are reversed if
the copayment rate is suffi ciently close to one. Notice that the two regimes detailed in Proposition
8 correspond to two of the several regimes detailed in Proposition 5 and the intuition behind this
16The proof of this proposition relies on a straightforward comparison of equilibrium expressions and is therefore
omitted.
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quality ranking mirrors the one discussed in relation to Proposition 5.
4.3 Optimal price and copayment rate
Finally, suppose that, at an initial stage of the game, the public payer chooses both the copayment
rate and the price (applying to the publicly funded providers) in order to maximise social welfare.
We start out by deriving the first-best solution and subsequently show how this solution can be
implemented by optimal choices of the price and the copayment rate.
4.3.1 The first-best solution
Suppose that the regulator is able to control quality and demand directly. Given the symmetry of
the model, transportation costs are clearly minimised if each consumer attends the nearest provider,
implying equal market shares for all providers. Maximising (9) with respect to the quality of each
provider under this symmetry assumption, the first-best quality level —equal for each provider —is





Intuitively, the first-best quality level is increasing in the consumers’marginal willingness to pay
for quality (β) and decreasing in the marginal cost of quality provision (captured by k).
4.3.2 Implementation of the first-best solution
Suppose that the regulator cannot set quality directly, but is able to commit to a particular funding
scheme as a long term decision. In other words, we let the regulator set both the price and the
copayment rate at the first stage of the game. Formally, the regulator maximises (9) with respect
to p and s. The unique solution to this problem is stated in the next proposition:
Proposition 9 If the regulator can commit to a funding scheme before the providers make their











The proof of this proposition is left to the interested reader, who can easily verify that the
first-best solution is implemented by plugging (40)-(41) into (27)-(30).
Social welfare is maximised by considering two different dimensions: minimising total trans-
portation costs and ensuring quality provision at a level where the marginal benefit is equal to the
marginal cost. Because of the two-dimensionality of the problem, two different instruments are
needed to implement the first-best solution, and this implies some degree of cost-sharing between
consumers and the public funder.
5 Extension: Public funding coverage
In this section we extend our analysis by introducing another policy variable, namely the degree
of public funding coverage among the providers in the market. Taking the above analysis as a
benchmark, we consider the effects (on quality provision and welfare) of (i) extending public funding
to include the third (private) provider, or (ii) restricting public funding only to the publicly owned
provider.
5.1 Public funding of all private providers
Suppose that all providers in the market, whether they are public or private, are subject to the same
funding scheme. This amounts to setting p3 = p and r3 = sp, which implies complete symmetry
between the two private providers (2 and 3). It also implies that all providers now only compete
along the quality dimension. The Nash equilibrium at the second stage of the game (described in
















The quality of the public provider is decreasing in the regulated price p whereas the quality of
publicly funded private providers is increasing in p. In addition, it follows immediately that more
competition (lower t) leads unambiguously to higher quality for the private providers, whereas
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the relationship between the degree of competition and quality of the public provider is a priori
indeterminate and depends on the size of the regulated price. In particular, if p − c is suffi ciently
high (low) relative to t, more competition leads to lower (higher) quality. All these results mirror
the previously derived results for Provider 1 and Provider 2 in the benchmark model.
What are the effects on equilibrium quality provision of extending the public funding coverage?
If copayment rates are relatively low, which is arguably the most relevant case, we are able to state
the following results:
Proposition 10 Suppose that s is suffi ciently low and that p − c is suffi ciently high relative to t.
In this case, an extension of public funding to all private providers leads to lower quality provision
by the public provider (qPF1 < q
∗





and qPF3 > q
∗
3).
Thus, within the range of parameters considered, a public funding extension tends to stimulate
quality provision for both private providers while lowering quality provision for the public provider.
As long as the incentives for quality provision among the private providers are suffi ciently strong
(i.e., as long as p − c is suffi ciently large relative to t), a public funding extension induces higher
quality for these providers. However, since the quality choice of the public provider is a strategic
substitute to the quality choices made by the private providers (see analysis and discussion in
Section 3.1.3), the former provider will respond by reducing its quality provision.
Since public and private providers respond differently to a public funding extension, the impli-
cation for average quality provision is a priori indeterminate. Numerical simulations suggest that
average quality tends to increase if the regulated price is suffi ciently high and decrease otherwise.
This is quite intuitive, since the level of the regulated price determines the market shares of the
providers. If p is relatively high, the market share of the public provider is relatively low (cf.
Proposition 1), implying that the effect on average quality is dominated by the quality increase of
the private providers. The opposite logic applies if p is relatively low.
5.2 No public funding of private providers
An alternative policy option is to abstain from funding private providers. Suppose instead that only
the public provider faces a regulated price and copayment rate, whereas each of the two private
providers must raise funds in the market by charging a price for the good provided. Thus, we
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assume a two-stage game similar to the one considered in the main analysis, but where the two
private providers simultaneously choose price at the second stage of the game. As before, we solve
the game by backwards induction.



















































Both private providers offer the same quality and price in equilibrium, both of which react positively
to an increase in the regulated price p or in the copayment rate s. We proceed to compare the
quality levels in (44)-(45) with our benchmark in (27)-(29). Once more we restrict attention to the
case of a relatively low copayment rate.
Proposition 11 Suppose that s is suffi ciently low and that p−c is suffi ciently high relative to t. In
this case, a removal of public funding for private providers leads to higher quality provision for the
public provider (qNPF1 > q
∗





and lower quality provision by the private provider with previous public funding (qNPF2 < q
∗
2).
The effects on quality provision of a funding removal are to a large extent the opposite of the
effects of a funding extension. Given that the private providers have suffi ciently strong incentives
to compete for demand (i.e., given that p− c is suffi ciently high relative to t), a removal of funding
reduces the incentives for quality provision for the private provider that loses its public funding.
However, because of strategic substitutability, the two other providers respond by increasing their
quality provision. Once more, the effect on average quality provision is a priori ambiguous, but
numerical simulations suggest that average quality will increase if the regulated price is suffi ciently
low and decrease otherwise. In qualitative terms, this is the opposite of the effect of a funding
17The second-order conditions are reported in Appendix A.
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Figure 1: Optimal funding coverage
extension. Intuitively, this is once more related to the relationship between the regulated price
and the market shares of the three providers. If the regulated price is low, the public provider has
a high market share and the average quality effect is driven by the quality increase of the public
provider. On the other hand, if the regulated price is suffi ciently high, the average quality effect is
driven by the quality reduction of the previously funded private provider, which has a high market
share in the pre-reform equilibrium.
5.3 Optimal degree of funding coverage
A natural extension of the above analysis is to consider the optimal degree of funding coverage. For
a given price and copayment rate, is welfare maximised by funding one or both private providers,
or by funding none of them? Of course, as shown in the previous section, the first-best outcome
can always be implemented by an appropriate choice of p and s, regardless of funding coverage.
Thus, an underlying assumption of the analysis in this section is that the price and the copayment
rate are exogenously determined by out-of-the-model considerations and do not coincide with the
first-best levels.
For analytical tractability reasons, our analysis is performed numerically. In Figure 1 we indicate
the optimal degree of funding coverage in (s, p)-space when the other parameters are given by β = 3,
k = 10, t = 2, c = 0.5 and v = 1. Although the figure is drawn for a particular set of parameters,
a similar picture emerges for alternative parameter configurations. The different regimes depicted
in Figure 1 reveal that there exists a trade-off between the generosity of the funding (the size of p)
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and the extension of public funding (how many private providers that are included in the public
funding scheme). If the regulated price is relatively low, welfare is maximised by extending funding
to both private providers. On the other hand, for a suffi ciently high price, it is optimal not to fund
any private provider. However, for intermediate ranges of p, the welfare optimal funding extension
is given by our benchmark case, where only one of the private providers is included in the public
funding scheme. This conclusion holds for all values of s, although the benchmark case is optimal
for a larger range of parameters if the copayment rate is relatively low.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have analysed quality competition among a welfare-maximising public provider
and two profit-maximising private providers, where the public and one of the private providers face
regulated prices and copayment rates, while the second private provider is free to set the price of
its good. This is a market structure that applies to health care and education markets in many
countries.
A common pattern among our findings is a differential response (in terms of quality provision)
across providers to changes in the parameters of the funding scheme or in the intensity of compe-
tition. The details of these results are described elsewhere. In this final section of the paper we
would like to briefly highlight some of the potential policy implications of our analysis. First, if
we take the presence of publicly funded provision with (relatively low) copayment rates as given,
we find that the welfare-maxmising price (given to the publicly funded providers) is increasing in
the copayment rate, as long as the copayment rate is at a suffi ciently low level. This indicates that
these two funding instruments are policy complements. In other words, if policy makers wish to
increase the copayment rate (from a suffi ciently low level), such a policy change should optimally
be accompanied by a corresponding increase in the regulated price, and vice versa. Second, we find
that the welfare effects of either extending public funding to more private providers, or removing
funding from currently funded providers, depend on the level of the regulated price. More precisely,
we find that more (fewer) providers should be publicly funded if the regulated price is suffi ciently
low (high). This suggests that the extent of the funding coverage (i.e., how many private providers
to include in the public funding scheme) and the generosity of the funding (i.e., the regulated price
level) are policy substitutes.
Our analysis is obviously not without limitations, and we would here like to mention two of
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them. Importantly, we have conducted the model in a framework where consumer preferences are
heterogeneous only along a horizontal dimension. This means that we are not able to capture
effects that might result from vertical preference differentiation, where some consumers have higher
willingness to pay for quality than others, for example. However, our model already includes
asymmetries along two different dimensions (provider objectives and public funding coverage), and
adding asymmetry along a third dimension would simply render the model intractable. Another
limitation is that we do not allow for any (exogenous or endogenous) differences in cost effi ciency
across public and private providers. There are several reasons why public versus private ownership
might lead to different incentives for cost-effi cient provision, for example the presence of soft budgets
associated with public ownership. Potential explorations along these lines are left for further
research.
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In the quality subgame, there are two conditions that do not trivially hold. First, the problem of










which requires k > 15β2/16t. Second, the Nash equilibrium is locally stable if the Jacobian of the



















































































which implies that the condition in (A3) holds if k is above some threshold value higher than
15β2/16t, which in turn implies that (A1) and (A2) always hold if (A3) holds.
















)2 < 0, (A6)
where





















Assuming that Θ > 0, the condition in (A6) holds if k > 3β2/2t. Evaluating the numerator in (A3)













β4 > 0. (A8)












Notice that ∂3Θ/∂k3 > 0 if k > 3β2/2t. This implies that ∂2Θ/∂k2 is monotonically increasing in









114s+ 272s2 + 245
)
> 0. (A10)






















56s+ 64s2 + 49
)
> 0. (A12)
Since Θ is positive and increasing in k at k = 3β2/2t, and since Θ is strictly convex for all
k > 3β2/2t, it follows that Θ is positive also for all k > 3β2/2t. Thus, the second-order condition
(A6) is satisfied if




and this condition ensures that the critical conditions in the quality subgame, (A1)-(A3), are also
satisfied.
Public funding of all private providers






= −k < 0. (A14)









which is true for k > k. Furthermore, equilibrium stability requires that the Jacobian is negative
34













































Both conditions hold if k ≥ k.
No public funding for the private providers























In the quality subgame, there are two sets of conditions that do not trivially hold. First, the








































































All the above conditions are satisfied if k ≥ k.
B. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1













































(i) The numerator in (B1) is monotonically increasing in k and positive for all k > k. Thus,
∂q∗1/∂p < 0 for all k > k.
(ii) The positive sign of (B2) is trivial.
(iii) The numerator in (B3) is monotonically increasing in s. Setting the numerator equal to
zero and solving for s, we derive
∂q∗3
∂p


















) > 0 for k ≥ k. (B5)
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 2

































































(i) Define A := θp + $. It follows immediately from (B6) that the sign of ∂q/∂p is equal to the
sign of A. Consider first the case of s = 0. In this case, we derive
∂4A
∂k4
= 43 008t3 (3c+ 5t) > 0, (B9)






= 672t2β2 (294p− 129c+ 91t) > 0. (B10)
Thus, we conclude that ∂3A/∂k3 > 0 for all k ≥ k, which implies that ∂2A/∂k2 is monotonically














4725β8 (7p− 11c− 4t)
2t
. (B13)
It follows that A > 0 for all k ≥ k if the three expressions in (B11), (B12) and (B13) are all positive.







Thus, if t is suffi ciently low relative to (p− c), then ∂q/∂p > 0 for all k > k. This has been shown
for s = 0 but, by continuity, the result also holds for s suffi ciently close to zero.
Consider next the case of s = 1. Following the same logic as for the case of s = 0, we derive
∂4A
∂k4















= 45β6 (3701 (p− c)− 1212t) (B18)
and
A|k=k =
675β8 (169 (p− c)− 60t)
2t
. (B19)
It follows that A > 0 for all k ≥ k if the expressions in (B17), (B18) and (B19) are all positive.




(p− c) . (B20)
Thus, if t is suffi ciently low relative to (p− c), then ∂q/∂p > 0 for all k > k. This has been shown
for s = 1 but, by continuity, the result also holds for s suffi ciently close to one.
(ii) Evaluating A at the lower bound k = k yields
A|k=k =
675β8 (49p− (77 + 92s) c+ 4 (8s+ 7) (2ps− t))
2t
. (B21)
The sign of this expression depends on the sign of the numerator, which is monotonically decreasing
in t. Since t is unbounded from above, the numerator is negative if t is suffi ciently large. Thus, at
k = k, ∂q/∂p < 0 for all s ∈ [0, 1] if t is suffi ciently high. By continuity, this result holds also for
38
k suffi ciently close to k. Furthermore, we also see that the numerator in (B21) is monotonically
increasing in p and monotonically decreasing in c. Setting p at the lower bound, i.e., p = c, we
derive
A|k=k;p=c = −
1350β8 [(16s+ 7) (1− s) c+ (7 + 8s) t]
t
< 0. (B22)
Thus, at k = k, ∂q/∂p < 0 for all s ∈ [0, 1] if (p− c) is suffi ciently small. Again, by continuity, this
result holds also for k suffi ciently close to k. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3






















) > 0, (B25)
It is straightforward to verify the unambiguous signs of these expressions for all k ≥ k. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4























































Define E := 3pΥ+χ. From (B26) it is clear that the sign of ∂q/∂s is given by the sign of E. Notice
that E is monotonically increasing in s for all k > k, which implies that q is a convex function of
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s. Consider first the case of s = 0. In this case, we derive
∂3E
∂k3
= −192t3 (21p+ 33c− 2t) . (B29)
We see that ∂3E/∂k3 < 0 if t is suffi ciently low, which in turn implies that ∂2E/∂k2 is monotonically
decreasing in k. Evaluating at the lower bound of k, we derive
∂2E
∂k2
|k=k = −4t2β2 (1941c+ 651p+ 316t) < 0, (B30)
which implies that ∂E/∂k is decreasing in k. Furthermore,
∂E
∂k





β6 (23c− 7p+ 8t) . (B32)
It follows that E < 0, and thus ∂q/∂s < 0, for all k > k, if the expressions in (B29), (B31) and








Consider next the case of s = 1. Following the same logic as for the case of s = 0, we derive
∂3E
∂k3
= 192t3 (33(p− c) + 2t) > 0, (B34)
∂2E
∂k2
|k=k = −4t2β2 (1941c− 1941p+ 316t) , (B35)
∂E
∂k






β6 (23c− 23p+ 8t) (B37)
It follows that E > 0, and thus ∂q/∂s > 0, for all k > k, if the expressions in (B35)-(B37) are all





Since E is monotonically increasing in s, we can conclude that, if p is neither very low nor very











there exists a threshold value of s which lies strictly between 0 and 1, such that ∂q/∂s < (>) 0 if
s is below (above) this threshold value. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6






































































Ψ : = −3p
(





















(i) From (B40) we see that the sign of ∂q∗1/∂t is the opposite of the sign of Φ. It is easily verified
that Φ is monotonically decreasing in p. Evaluating Φ at the lower bound of the regulated price,




















Since p is unbounded from above and Φ is monotonically decreasing in p, it follows that Φ changes
sign from positive to negative if p exceeds some threshold level. Thus, ∂q∗1/∂t < (>) 0 if p is
suffi ciently low (high).
(ii) The negative sign of (B42) is trivial.
(iii) From (B43) we see that the sign of ∂q∗3/∂t is given by the sign of Ψ. It is also easy to verify












Setting s at the lower bound, s = 0, we derive
∂4Ψ
∂k4
= 18 432ct4 > 0, (B47)






= 96t3β2 (42p+ 162c+ t) > 0. (B48)












= 90tβ6 (37c+ 6t) > 0, (B50)










Thus, if s = 0 and p < (33c+ 8t) /7, Ψ > 0 for all k ≥ k.























β8 (33 (p− c)− 8t) (B56)
It follows that Ψ < 0 for s = 1 and all k ≥ k if the expressions in (B53)-(B56) are all negative.





Since Ψ is monotonically decreasing in s, we can conclude that, if p is neither very low nor very











there exists a threshold value of s which lies strictly between 0 and 1, such that ∂q∗3/∂t > (<) 0 if
s is below (above) this threshold value. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7














where ∆ is defined by (38) and where




































































It is easy to verify that this expression is positive (negative) if s is suffi ciently low (high). Let us
first consider that case of s = 0, which implies that ∂4ς/∂k4 > 0, thus implying that ∂3ς/∂k3 is




|k=k,s=0 = 37 632t3β4 (126c+ 41t) > 0, (B62)
∂2ς
∂k2
|k=k,s=0 = 2352t2β6 (563c+ 176t) > 0, (B63)
∂ς
∂k





Thus, we conclude that ς > 0, and thus, ∂p (s) /∂s > 0, for all k > k, if s = 0. By continuity, this
result also applies for values of s suffi ciently close to zero.
Next, consider the case of s = 1, which implies that ∂4ς/∂k4 < 0, thus implying that ∂3ς/∂k3





|k=k,s=1 = −768t3β4 (22 635c+ 8381t) < 0, (B66)
∂2ς
∂k2
|k=k,s=1 = −48t2β6 (270 901c+ 100 112t) < 0, (B67)
∂ς
∂k




β10 (6351c+ 1408t) < 0. (B69)
Thus, we conclude that ς < 0, and thus, ∂p (s) /∂s < 0, for all k > k, if s = 1. By continuity, this
result also applies for values of s suffi ciently close to one. Q.E.D
Proof of Proposition 10
A comparison of the equilibrium expressions in (42)-(43) with the corresponding expressions in
(27)-(29) yields:













Ξ : = 3ktβ4 (79p− 63c)− 48kt
(






















































= −96t3 (3 (c− sp) + t) . (B75)
This expression is negative if s is suffi ciently low, which in turn implies that ∂2Ξ/∂k2 is monotoni-
cally decreasing in k. By evaluating the subsequent expressions at the lower bound of k, we derive
∂2Ξ
∂k2
|k=k = −2t2β2 (3p (65− 72s) + 21c+ 16t) , (B76)
∂Ξ
∂k




β6 (p (9− 8s)− c) . (B78)
It follows that Ξ < 0, and thus qPF1 < q
∗
1, for all k > k if the expressions in (B76)-(B78) are all
negative. It is straightforward to verify that (B78) is negative for all s ∈ (0, 1) while (B76) is
negative if s is suffi ciently low. For (B77) to be negative, we need the additional condition that
p− c is suffi ciently high relative to t.
(ii) The positive sign of (B72) is trivial.
(iii) The sign of (B73) is given by the sign of ρ. Taking the second-order derivative of ρ with
respect to k yields
∂2ρ
∂k2
= 64t2 (3p (2− s)− 3c− t) . (B79)
It is easy to verify that the expression in (B79) is positive if p− c is suffi ciently high relative to t,
which in turn implies that ∂ρ/∂k is monotonically increasing in k. By evaluating the subsequent
expressions at the lower bound of k, we derive
∂ρ
∂k
|k=k = 6tβ2 (57p− 34sp− 23c− 8t) , (B80)
ρ|k=k = 90pβ4 (1− s) . (B81)
Both of these expressions are positive, implying that ρ > 0 and thus qPF3 > q
∗
3 for all k > k, if p− c
is suffi ciently high relative to t. Q.E.D
Proof of Proposition 11
A comparison of (44)-(45) with (27)-(29) yields:
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= 3360t3 (3(c− sp) + t) . (B87)
This expression if positive, implying that ∂2ξ/∂k2 is monotonically increasing in k, if s is suffi ciently
low. Evaluating at the lower bound k, we derive
∂2ξ
∂k2
|k=k = 2t2β2 (p (8505− 6056s)− 2449c− 880t) , (B88)
∂ξ
∂k





β6 (p (567− 520s)− 47c) . (B90)
The signs of (B88)-(B90) are all positive if p − c is suffi ciently large relative to t. It follows that
ξ > 0 and thus qNFP1 > q
∗
1, for all k > k, if s is suffi ciently low and p− c is suffi ciently large relative
to t.


















and from which we derive
∂F
∂k
= −t (3p (45− 16s)− 87c− 32t) . (B92)
It is easily confirmed that the sign of (B92) is negative if s is suffi ciently low and p−c is suffi ciently
large relative to t, implying that F is monotonically decreasing in k. Evaluating F at the lower
bound of k yields
F |k=k = −
1
2
β2 (p (81− 80s)− c) < 0. (B93)
It follows that F < 0 and thus qNPF2 < q
∗
2, for all k > k, if s is suffi ciently low and p−c is suffi ciently
large relative to t.




= 192t3 (51 (c− sp) + 11t) . (B94)
For a suffi ciently low value of s, this expression is positive, which implies that ∂2%/∂k2 is monoton-
ically increasing in k. Evaluating the subsequent expressions at the lower bound of k yields
∂2%
∂k2
|k=k = 4t2β2 (1073c+ 945p+ 104t− 2018sp) , (B95)
∂%
∂k
|k=k = tβ4 (1477c+ 567p+ 192t− 2044sp) , (B96)
%|k=k = 165β
6 (c− sp) . (B97)
48
It is straightforward to see that (B95)-(B97) are all positive if s is suffi ciently low. In this case, it
follows that % > 0 and thus qNPF3 > q
∗
3 for all k > k. Q.E.D
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